Democracy in Africa: A Mirage in Front of Violent Extremism and Coups d’Etat?

By Benjamin Coovi DAKO, PhD

Doctor in Political Science, specialist in health policies

Consultant in Development and Lecturer in health policy at the Faculty of Law and Political Science and at the National School of Administration

University of Abomey-Calavi, Republic of Benin

The pitiful image of Africa, still conveyed throughout the world today, is that of a violent and radicalized youth, wandering in the streets of Mogadishu, these miserable victims of the devastating civil war in Sudan and South Sudan, hundreds of thousands of women and children wandering in displaced persons camps in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and northern Nigeria, due to Muslim jihadism, victims of various abuses and rapes in the east of the Republic of Congo. The list is long. Meanwhile, other countries are hard hit by coups d’Etat (army rebellion), sometimes repetitive, abruptly putting an end to the rule of law and democracy on the black continent.

This discussion paper is structured around five (5) parts. The first will be an exercise in the duty of memory on the genesis of conflicts, from independence to the present day. The second will take stock of hotbeds of violent extremism and countries prey to repetitive coups d’Etat; the third part will focus on the different causes of violent extremism and coups d’Etat; the fourth part will propose a theoretical framework for approaches to sustainable solutions to these phenomena, so that Africa becomes a haven of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, a fifth part will suggest a role that regional organizations promoting democracy, good governance and development must now play, through globalizing and well-coordinated measures, to contain the horrors of violent extremism and attacks of state in Africa.

I- VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COUPS IN AFRICA: CONGENITAL EVILS

Coups d’Etat, wars and conflicts in Africa are complex and must be placed in a historical context, arising from fierce competition in the monopolization of natural resources by antagonistic communities or groups. These internal or regional conflicts, carried out mainly with the help of light weapons by non-state armed groups, and by rebel factions of regular armies, were nourished by cultural bases, regarding the recruitment and mobilization of soldiers, militia and rebel groups. A look at this historical evolution of conflicts in Africa reveals four (4) essential periods, namely:

1. The 1st period, that before colonization, marked by the organization of resistance against the powers of traditional societies led by powerful and omnipotent sovereigns.
2. The 2nd period, marked by the colonial penetration, during which intense resistance was organized by movements of African people aiming to repel the invaders ;
3. The 3rd period corresponds to the liberation struggle heroically led by Africans in order to drive the colonizer out of their newly independent country and to regain control of the economic apparatus including the lands, but above all the dignity and freedom, which, according to the colonized peoples, should derive from real autonomy and political independence.
4. The 4th period is that of the disenchantment of Africans with respect to an independence so sought after but which, ultimately, did not meet the many expectations. Resentments arose in fact when populations began to witness, in shock, the serious excesses and deviances orchestrated by the new African bosses of the regimes established in their countries. Dictatorial regimes, ferocious predators of natural resources, thus dissipating all hope of fulfillment and development. Under these conditions, groups of rebels and militias took up arms to overthrow these systems established as real distributive coalitions, clan or sometimes family, of national wealth.

II- SYNOPTIC VIEW OF HOMES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COUPS D’ETAT IN AFRICA

Today, in addition to militias and rebel groups demanding democracy, freedom and social justice, other movements have been created for religious and cultural demands. These include jihadist groups operating mainly in the Sahel region. Table 1 below presents a synoptic view of African countries in conflict since independence.

painting  1. Chronological presentation of the main sources of conflict in Africa

Year	Country	Conflict Name	Type of conflict
1948-1994	South Africa	Anti-apartheid struggle	internal
1954-1962	Algeria	Independance War	independence
1955 to 2024	Sudan	Civil wars​​​	internal
1960-1965	DRC	Post-independence war and rebellion	internal
1960-1994​	Rwanda	Ethnic unrest	internal /ethnic
1961-1974	Angola	Independance War	independence
1962-1974	Guinea-Bissau	Independance War	independence
1964-1975	Mozambique	Independance War	independence
1965-1980	Zimbabwe	Anti-racial power war	independence
1966-1990	Namibia	Independance War	independence
1966-1969	Nigeria	Biafran Civil War	internal
1966-2022​	Chad	Civil War​​	internal
1966	Namibia	Attempted secession	internal /regional
1970s-2000s	Burundi	Ethnic unrest	internal /ethnic
1974-2000​	Ethiopia	Revolution and secession conflicts	internal
1974-1991	Eritrea	Independance War	internal
1975-1991	Mozambique	Civil war	internal
1976-1977	Ethiopia/Somalia	Ogaden War	interstate
1979	Tanzania/Uganda	Tanzanian invasion	interstate
1978-1991	Ethiopia	Civil war	interstate
1980-1986	Uganda	Civil war	internal
1982-	Senegal	Attempted secession	internal
1983-1985	Zimbabwe	Unrest in Matabeleland	internal
1983-2005 and since 2020	Sudan	Civil Wars​	internal
1984-1989	Somalia	Civil War	internal
1989-1997	Liberia	Civil war	internal /regional
1990-1994	Rwanda	Civil war/genocide	internal /ethnic
1990-	Sierra Leone	Civil war	internal /ethnic
1991	Somalia	Civil war	internal
1992-2002	Angola	Civil war	internal
1993-	Burundi	Civil war	internal /ethnic
1996-2003	Central African Republic	Mutinies/civil war	internal
1997-2000	Congo	Civil war	internal
1997	Comoros	Anjouan War	internal
1996-1997	DRC	Civil war	regional
1998-2001	DRC	Civil war	regional
1998-1999	Lesotho	Armed clashes	internal
1998-1999	Guinea-Bissau	Civil war	internal
1998	Ethiopia/Eritrea	Border War	interstate
2000	Guinea	External attacks	regional
2002	Ivory Coast	Civil war	internal /regional
Since 2000	Mali	Jihadist terrorism	internal /regional
Since 2000	Burkina Faso	Jihadist terrorism	internal /regional
Since 2000	Niger	Jihadist terrorism	internal /regional

Source: Translated, updated (2024) and adapted from DFID, FCOL, MOD ¹.

Since the 2000s, some countries in the Sahel have faced a regional jihadist insurgency. These are Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Mauritania. Mali and Burkina Faso particularly have faced repeated and often deadly terrorist attacks in recent years. The inability of those states to put an end to such murderous madness is one of the reasons given by certain officers of the regular armies for carrying out coups de force and establishing themselves in power for an indefinite period. Table n°2 is a summary of the countries that have experienced coups d’Etat on the African continent since independence.

Table n°2 : African countries and coups d’Etat, from 1960 to nowadays. 

Order number	Country	Number of coups d’Etat
1	Zaïre (DR Congo)	4
2	Ethiopia	2
3	Togo	3
4	Benin	6
5	Tanzania	1
6	Gabon	3
7	Algeria	1
8	Burundi	7
9	Central African Republic	5
10	Burkina Faso	8
11	Nigeria	6
12	Ghana	5
13	Uganda	3
14	Republic of Congo	5
15	Mali	5
16	Sudan	7
17	Libya	3
18	Somalia	1
19	Lesotho	2
20	Morocco	2
21	Rwanda	2
22	Niger	7
23	Chad	4
24	Comoros	3
25	Seychelles	1
26	Mauritania	5
27	Equatorial Guinea	2
28	Liberia	1
29	Guinea Bissau	6
30	Gambia	3
31	Guinea	3
32	Cameroon	0
33	Tunisia	1
34	Sierra Leone	1
35	Sao Tome and Principe	2
36	Zambia	1
37	Ivory Coast	1
38	Madagascar	2
39	Egypt	1
40	Zimbabwe	1

Source: The author.

An analytical look at table n°2 shows that out of 40 countries, nine (9) display relatively high figures for more or less recent coups d’Etat. International news also shows that these are countries where peace and security are under severe test and where democracy is stammering. These are in this case Burkina Faso with 8 coups d’Etat including the two ones in the last two years (2022-2023), Burundi with 7 coups d’Etat, the Central African Republic with 5 coups, Niger and Sudan each with 7 coups, Congo (Brazza) with 5 coups and Guinea Bissau which recorded 6. As for Benin Republic (formerly described as the sick child of Africa) and Nigeria where 6 coups d’Etat were recorded respectively, the last ones going back a long way, these two countries have, for several decades, experiences of relative stability and democracy bringing hope, notwithstanding the persistence of the murderous incursions perpetrated by the armed group Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding this analysis on the persistence of coups d’Etat in some African countries, it should be noted that these events have not always been detrimental to democracy on the continent. The army has been, in certain cases, a tool for reestablishing the rule of law and democracy. In any case, these interventions cannot themselves legitimize the intervention of the army in political rule although they demonstrate the fragility of the democratic processes in progress.

The analysis of this table further reveals that democracy and coups d’état do not go hand in hand and that the countries victims of recurrent coups d’état are currently under the yoke of exceptional regimes, whose desire to restore the democratic institutions still seem uncertain. On April 10, 2024, the military junta in power in Mali finally crossed the rubicund through a press release formally prohibiting any demonstration or declaration by opposition political parties or movements as well as critical associations of government action, going as far as to order the media, on April 11, to refrain from covering such demonstrations. The same scenario is almost underway in Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea, countries led by military juntas which seized power through coups d’état.

Even more uncertain is the socio-economic situation of these countries, subjected to the torment of coups d’état or murderous abuses by non-state armed groups.

III- THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND COUPS D’ETAT IN AFRICA

Several studies carried out by eminent researchers, notably Naomi Chazan , Peter Lewis and others ², have shown that conflicts perpetrated by non – state armed groups are due to numerous and diverse causes linked, among others, to a on the one hand, to the weakness, fragility and collapse of the state and, on the other hand, to the recurrent situation of bad governance that such countries experience. This study focuses on these two categories of causes, which constitute the results of all the various causes of the crises that African States have been going through since their nominal independence.

A- The weakness, fragility, and collapse of the State in Africa.

“A state is a set of interconnected and coordinated institutions that organize political power ³” . The State holds certain prerogatives, notably that of issuing mandatory rules and using and controlling security and defense institutions. The State also has the power to determine resources, including the raising of various direct or indirect taxes to satisfy the needs of the populations. This requires the recognition and involvement of all communities, including minorities and the weakest sections of society, to guarantee the interactions necessary for good governance of public affairs.

On the political level, the State establishes laws and other instruments for a peaceful democracy, equipped with a mechanism of alternation adapted to the sociological, cultural, and economic context of the nation.

But do the African states resulting from decolonization meet these criteria and obligations today? Is the State really fulfilling its responsibilities towards the populations? Are minorities and the most disadvantaged groups considered in the design and implementation of public policies?

Objective answer to this question requires a review of the indicators of the decline of certain African States. These indicators were compiled from scientific documents consulted and empirical analyzes of the situation experienced by such the States.

Indicators of state deliquescence in Africa

The State in Africa has been the subject of diverse, disparate, and sometimes negative descriptions and characterizations. It has been described by several political analysts as authoritarian and repressive. Others paint African states as weak, fragile, ghosts, on the verge of collapse, unstable, corrupt, overly bureaucratized, and poorly institutionalized.

In any case, whatever the descriptions and characterizations, it seems obvious that African states certainly have many conventional state attributes. But some are failing when it comes to the substance of their actions on the ground. African states have become a favorable political arrangement and a source of privileges and wealth for their supporters, especially in a hypothesis of ambiguity between political regime and state.

Osaghae ^4’s observation according to which many African states are fragile and facing difficulties was reiterated in the 2021 World Bank report, which listed several fragile states, including 14 in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African countries have also occupied the lowest rungs of the United Nations Human Development Index for several decades. Foreign Policy ‘s 2008 Failed States Index already listed 11 African

states : Chad , Ivory Coast, CAR , DRC , Guinea , Ethiopia , Nigeria , Somalia, Sudan , Uganda and Zimbabwe , among the 20 states it identified as weak and failing.

This classification is based on critical indicators of weakness, fragility, failure and collapse, such as the level of stability and security, the legitimacy of the ruling elite, the quality of governance and bi- and multilateral relations. Other indicators including the level of the economy and public services, protection of human rights, movement of people, etc., have also been taken into account in this classification.

From the analysis of the situation of African States prey to recurrent coups d’Etat or the horrors of non-state armed groups, the following key indicators could be listed⁵:

• The absence or weakness of the rules and principles of the rule of law and democracy;
• The ambiguity of the constitution or legal provisions, particularly those relating to elections and the alternation of power;
• The unfree, non-transparent and fraudulent elections with, as a corollary, the confiscation of state power by a clan or group of people to the detriment of other political organizations;
• The difficulties of asserting the authority of the state on the territory and vis-à-vis the populations, and the inability to secure borders;
• The lack of interest of citizens in the actions of the state and the emergence of geo-ethnic groups hostile to the regime in place ;
• The inability of authorities to effectively regulate and control activities and economic transactions; which translates​ sometimes by the prevalence of smuggling, currency trafficking, money laundering and the proliferation of weapons and non-state armed groups ;
• The inability to enforce public order, the rule of law and security;
• The collapse of public services, in this case those in vital sectors such as education, health, water and energy, etc. ;
• The Chronic difficulties in planning and effectively implementing adequate public policies for inclusive and sustainable economic and social development ;
• The confiscation, by clans illegally risen to power, of the country’s wealth, particularly revenues from natural resources; the populations or groups of populations thus despoiled, after many attempts to make themselves heard, have no other means than to resort to arms;
• The notorious failures to prevent or control, across the entire territory, the birth and development of small groups of violence ;
• The inability of the defense and security forces to establish and maintain discipline within them, and to fully assume their responsibility at the level of the population;
• The country’s dependence on private military companies, metropolitan agencies or neighboring countries, for the establishment of the state security apparatus and support for national defense and security forces; this dependence sometimes constitutes a double-edged sword: it ensures, apparently, the training and equipment of regular national forces; but it can also pave the way for creation of non-state armed groups, detrimental to the national peace and security protection and promotion ;
• The inability to prevent and manage insurgents, external threats or military intrusions from neighboring countries, etc.

Another major indicator of state weakness and decay is the prevalence of violent politics or violence in politics. There are indeed, in the African countries affected by the phenomenon studied, close links between politics, politicians, political elites, the ruling classes and the constitution of irregular and clandestine private armies. Politicians and government officials, in some circumstances, hire armed bands to fight their enemies, arm one group to rout another, or use proxy armed groups to create conflict within or between groups or communities. The creation or connivence with violent groups in fact confer to such the political mandators a position of superiority, prone to peddling influence over their adversaries, either to protect their positions or to intimidate them.

From another point of view, it turned out that the method of transferring power from the colonial authority to those of the new independent states had already shaped the future ideological trends and, consequently, the political and economic development of the citizenship of such the states. The latter had strong hopes for development and economic and social success, which hopes quickly dissipated in the face of deficiencies and vulnerabilities of all kinds of the new authorities. From then on, instability had become one of the characteristics of the new States which could not resist the fatal shift into violence and insecurity, fertile environment for the birth and reproduction of militias and rebel groups in the space of just a few decades after independence in several African countries. This analysis is thus aligned with the famous “Failed States Theory ⁶”, according to which the proliferation of militias and rebel groups in Africa arises from the serious congenital insufficiencies of newly independent African states.

But of course, other historical factors in this situation exist. These include the Cold War and its consequences, which significantly transformed the nature of conflicts in Africa; a galloping population and environmental degradation, all of which exert enormous pressure on African states, and generate crucial needs for alternative resources to alleviate the harsh daily living conditions of populations in general and those of vulnerable groups in particular.

Furthermore, it has been shown that generational conflicts can also lead to creation and proliferation of militia groups or rebels. Social inequalities indeed produce in many African countries, theaters of numerous abuses, enormous gaps between completely desperate young people and their middle-class or wealthy elders. Young people who become layers easily recruited by rebel groups.

Social marginalization has also been identified as a phenomenon that makes it easier for marginalized groups to take up arms, just as religious persecution or even outbursts of religious fundamentalism can generate the birth of rebel groups or armed militias.

These diverse and varied indicators of weakness, decline and failure of States, constitute undeniable causes of the proliferation of armed groups and militias in certain unstable States in Africa as well as numerous coups d’état perpetrated in others. But the question of poor governance of public affairs is, by far, the major result of the conflict-provoking situations experienced by the countries concerned.

B- Pathogenic public governance

“ African countries continue to build on the achievements in governance that they have made since the early 1990s. According to the African Development Bank, good governance must be based on (I) effective States, (ii ) mobilized civil societies and (iii) an effective private sector. The key elements of good governance are therefore accountability, transparency, the fight against corruption, citizen participation and a favorable legal/judicial framework .⁷

According to Ekelegbe ⁸, the rise and multiplication of non – state armed groups in Africa since independence reflects the continent’s governance crisis, which marginalizes and excludes certain groups for various reasons. The tragedy of state weakness and failure, and its consequences for human security, can best be overcome through promising nation -building projects, preserving the state against a selfish and voracious national elite. Thus, that the establishment of e-governance with a sustainable human face and truly oriented towards the interests of all, without exclusion. Nation building projects should specifically aim at resolving issues of identity and accelerate economic development, the equitable distribution of national wealth, the inclusion of citizens in national construction and the equitable use of state power. National development policies should aim to promote cohesion, stability and national unity.

But irony of fate! Despite the numerous grievances of coup authors and non – state armed groups against the powers in place, notably their inability to provide goods and services to all, it has often turned out that they themselves, once installed in power, struggle to design and implement political and economic reforms necessary for development. Worse, these new regimes tend to shift in criminal abuses and take advantage of the institutional vacuum to illegally extract resources from the territory. Many of them set up similar authoritarian structures to those of their predecessors. Examples are currently legion in West Africa such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, etc., with the barely veiled flouting of human rights and the taking hostage of the mysteries of power and economy by radicalized juntas.

IV- VIOLENT EXTREMISM, COUPS D’ETAT AND DEMOCRACY: THE SNAKE BITTING ITS TAIL

Faced with the frightening geographical expansion of violent extremism, particularly in its religious currents (AQMI, AL QAIDA, BOKO HARAM, MUJAO, etc.) in sub-Saharan Africa, and a current near resurgence of coups d’état in certain ECOWAS countries, with their consequences on human rights, democracy and economic and social development, the paradox is disturbing to note that part of the people in Niger, in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea or Mali, seems to rejoice at the fall of elected or legitimate leaders. He takes the latter to be the main responsible for their situation. This is reasonably explained by the difficulties, socio-economic conditions experienced by the populations for decades, and the serious deterioration of the democratic system supposed to guarantee their development as free and prosperous people.

According to Professor Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi, from the Department of Political Science at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, Nigeria, “People blinded by suffering celebrate what appears to be the end of suffering, even if they do not understand that it is from the beginning of another ⁹“.

The populations are in fact exasperated by their structural economic difficulties, while the political princes, “elected” or co-opted, continue to constantly get drunk in insolent luxury. In this context, it is understandable to welcome changes, even abrupt ones, and with uncertain consequences. Very often, these changes welcomed with great fanfare end in disillusionment and disenchantment, silenced and repressed by security apparatuses more oppressive than the previous ones. Because the new masters, like wolves, only dressed themselves in lambskin. Experience on the ground proves that they are more fearful and therefore afraid of popular reactions against possible deviations for which they are responsible. They know that they are barely up to the difficult task of ensuring good governance of a country. They are aware of their limits in terms of designing and implementing adequate public policies for sustainable economic and social development. There are even some who are only driven by the taste for profit and the cult of personality. What follows is a systematic muzzling of opponents, members of civil society and human rights activists. Democracy is at half-mast sine die. The constitutional institutions of the Republic disappear for a long time, giving way to provisional “permanent” structures.

The juntas in power will have difficulty finding the means to install the necessary dynamic for the change so hoped for by the populations. Because they don’t have the capacity. This is rather corroborated by Professor Abdullahi (cited above) according to whom “Military juntas cannot solve an economic problem, because it goes beyond their area of expertise”. In Mali and Burkina Faso, for example, the juntas are already running out of steam in their fight against the territorial expansion of jihadists and therefore in their preferred mission of defending territorial integrity. Because they are now faced with the daily challenges of economic and social governance. To each his job! The scientific concept of current public governance is nowadays a kind of professionalism. Even political professionals, concerned by their political mandate success, must surround themselves with elites trained and molded in good public governance.

In conclusion, coups d’état and violent extremism are the result of political, economic, social and cultural deviances that have become unbearable by the abused populations. But their occurrence does not augur the qualitative changes desired by the latter who often welcome them with great fanfare like rescue operations on the high seas. Demonstrations and popular jubilations dissipate in a very short time, giving way to disenchantment against the backdrop of more ferocious repression of dissidents as well as unfortunate wanderings detrimental to good public governance. The much sought-after economic, social, inclusive and sustainable development becomes therefore an illusion.

The solution, in these conditions, calls for the reestablishment of democratic principles and the rule of law. Which seems chimerical in the context of intransigent soldiers! Another coup may then be the only alternative! So, one coup d’état thus could provoke another one because provocative circumstances are endemic. The examples of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are perfect illustrations. It is a vicious circle, reinforced by ongoing violent extremism in some countries. Democracy in Africa still faces, in these conditions, dark days for its advent and development.

V- PROPOSAL FOR A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR A MODEL OF RESILIENT DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

In order to contain the impulses of violent extremism and repetitive coups d’état with a view to accelerating the democratic process on the African continent, it seems important to invent more adapted and more flexible military and democratic models, of a share, and to act positively on factors such as state governance, strengthening the role of elites, youth and women, integrated management of border areas , rationalization and transparency in balanced management natural resources, on the other hand. To contribute to achieving such a goal, a theoretical framework is proposed below for political decision-makers, civil society and international organizations concerned by the African democracy and the development of the continent.

A- For more adapted and flexible models of army and democracy

• Make the army a pro-democracy institution in Africa

In a political and social context that is rather too conflict-prone today on the African continent, shock therapy becomes crucial: the institutionalization of a “Democracy-army tandem”. For that, the strengthening of the democratic culture, coupled with the construction of a pro-democracy army, is essential. The army must become an army of professionals, serving the people, and be engaged in daily support activities for the populations. The army must transform itself into a republican institution like any other; it must become an organization of the social body and be involved in civil -military services including civic education. In other words, the African army must become an army very close to the people, while retaining its republican mission, the defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

• Invent a sociologically relevant democratic model

« Constitution sans culture constitutionnelle n’est que ruine du constitutionnalisme » (Constitution without constitutional culture is only the ruin of constitutionalism) ¹⁰” . This statement by Du Bois postulates the need to establish an appropriate framework for the facilitation, strengthening and popularization of democratic culture in African countries. Because most political crises are linked to ignorance of the minimum rules in democracy and, particularly, those of the rule of law. Du Bois’s postulate also suggests respect for the constitution by all political actors and leaders at all levels. He further suggests boosting constitutional engineering through a broad popularization of democratic principles which must be properly adapted to the socio-cultural and socio-anthropological realities of the African societies.

Another major challenge that must be taken up is undoubtedly the quest for the legitimacy of leaders and especially the President of the Republic. In this case, fundamental reflections are necessary on the relevance or not of the election by direct universal suffrage of the person who is elected to assume this function. Because numerous examples clearly show that acute crises are rather generated by these electoral consultations organized forceps, on the basis of so-called universal criteria, but devoid, for a good part, of any holistic foundation of African realities. In this regard, tongues are already being loosened at the level of literature to consider the use of a so-called consolidative democracy. An hypothesis likely to instigate a rotation of the executive between the different ethnic groups. This consolidation of democratic culture could make the army’s incursions into political rule anachronistic or even inappropriate.

Anyway, it seems impertinent today to hide in so-called universal model of democracy to build and support solid democratic societies in a multicultural, multi-ethnic Africa, and above all, face to chronic existential difficulties. It is time to experiment with another democratic model. A model that suits African countries and which appears to be the most profitable in terms of costs, legitimacy and stability of the regimes. Therefore, it would be more relevant and judicious to contextualize African constitutions and “endogenize” the criteria and rules for organizing electoral consultations. A model which is a synthesis of the universally recognized rules of democracy and those inspired by the traditional, cultural and socio-anthropological norms of African peoples. However, this new desired experience should not constitute an obstacle to the development and perpetuation of Western-style democracy in some African countries which are already well advanced in this direction. Because, each people has its own realities.

B- For a more conscientious political elite

To better understand the relationship between democracy, coups d’Etat and violent extremism in Africa, particular attention needs to be paid to how political elites govern the state, manipulate communities and resort to violence to maintain power. For that, the thorny question of the conduct of electoral processes, their transparency and their fairness must be explained. All observed cases reveal unsavory arrangements, corruption and nebulous dealings between politicians, opportunistic elites and manipulated youth.

Faced with the extent of attempts at cheating, tampering and fraud observed in the organization of elections in Africa, phenomena often attributable to politicians, it is imperative, for credible international organizations, attached to democratic principles and the rule of law, to set up training and awareness programs for the actors concerned. These include the ruling elites as well as those in opposition political parties. The responsibility lies particularly with international financing institutions to intensify their conditionalities for granting and disbursing loans to States, and to impose strict observance of said conditionalities in the countries considered.

C- For the establishment of a reliable and sustainable framework for the development of young people and women

Approaches to preventing and combating coups d’Etat and violent extremism must aim to address social inequalities, marginalization and vulnerabilities that facilitate the emergence of culturally violent youth. It is also about creating technical and professional training opportunities to ennoble young people and women, with a view to facilitating their real participation in the definition and implementation of public policies oriented towards inclusive and sustainable development.

Such policies should primarily aim to prevent young people from joining armed groups. They would consist in education programs for peace and values respectful of life and democratic rules. These programs should enable the governments of states faced with the phenomena in question, to further encourage young people to engage in productive activities rather than joining violent groups, which sow terror on the continent.

D- For the establishment of the principle for the shared prosperity at all levels of public governance

Measures likely to contribute to eliminating the risk of coups d’Etat and violent extremism should include the systematization of shared and truly inclusive prosperity, the increase in a flexible index, according to the cost of living and the evolution inflation, income levels of all segments of the population, as well as the equitable distribution of income from natural wealth. This must be accompanied by the adoption of democratic principles such as the rule of law, the strengthening of political, economical and social rights, open government, the active participation of citizens in public affairs, both at national and local level and, above all, the regularity of the alternation in power with free, transparent and inclusive elections.

E- The role of regional organizations, African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Southern African Development Community (SADEC), etc. .,

Although strengthening national institutions and state capacity, promoting economic growth, reducing corruption, and sharing power among ethnic groups have been highlighted as strategies for dealing with coups d’Etat and violent extremism, they should be more effective and efficient in a regional or international approach.

It is obvious that there are rebel activities that transcend national borders and have regional dimensions. For example, dealing with rebel actions in conflict zones such as the Mano River and Great Lakes regions can be very complicated due to the skill with which these groups tactically and strategically use porous borders. This is why strategies to combat such actions should focus on border areas through the establishment in those areas of effective state authorities. Such an approach would constitute an important step towards regional solutions to transnational conflicts. The regional organizations evoked above should work in a concerted network, under the aegis of the African Union, for the design and implementation of integrated and more encompassing strategies, based on all geographical, economic, social and cultural realities of Africa.

 

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1. The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, working paper, October 2001, p. 25 ;
2. Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis and others, Politics and Society in contemporary Africa (Cambridge University Press, 1997, p8 ); 
3. Naomi Chazan , Peter Lewis et al (1997,8) (op cit );
4. Osaghae , Fragile states , (pp 692 to 693);
5. Review of adpf journals , selection of May 2006, Serge SUR: “On Failing States”; article initially published in the journal Commentaire , n°112, winter 2005;
6. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and politics in Africa , Boulder, Colo.: Lyne Rienner , 1992;
7. Professor of Political Science and Vice Chancellor, Western Delta University, Oghara , Delta State -Cited by 3244‬‬ – Comparative Politics‬ – Security‬ ;  ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬
8. Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi , from the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University , Zaria, Nigeria;
9. Du Bois de Gaudusson, 2007, Post-colonial mimicry, and after . p. 333.